Medicare's Part D offers heavily subsidized new drug coverage to 22.5 million seniors to date, of whom 16.5 million are in stand-alone drug plans (Department of Health and Human Services, 2006). The government delegated the delivery of the benefit to private insurance companies arguing that market incentives would lead them to provide coverage at the lowest price possible. The massive entry of plans and the large variety of actuarial designs and formularies offered make it complicated to assess how insurers set premiums during this first year of the program. This paper presents the first econometric evidence on whether premiums in the stand-alone drug plan markets are driven by the relevant factors predicted by insurance theory. Using data gathered from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, we measure a plan's generosity as the simulated out of pocket payments for different sets of drugs. We also identify the listed full drug prices by each insurer and merge these with other plan and geographical characteristics to test predictions about how insurers set premiums. We find evidence that a) the number of insurers in a market is big enough such that it does not appear to influence premiums, b) the full drug prices listed appear to be reflected to some degree in the premiums charged c) plan characteristics such as the provision of extra coverage are reflected in higher premiums, but overall there is a weak relationship between premiums and simulated out of pocket payments for different sets of drugs d) the institutional setting and regional market characteristics affect the firms' bidding behavior and their resulting premiums. Insurers appear to have responded strongly to program incentives such as the automatic enrollment of dual Medicaid-Medicare beneficiaries into low cost plans.
Introduction
The 2003 Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) created a new market for prescription drug coverage in which premiums are heavily subsidized. The subsidy was a key feature in attracting private insurers to participate, as it is unlikely that an unsubsidized stand-alone prescription drug benefit for the elderly would survive due to adverse selection (Pauly and Zeng ,2003) . Medicare beneficiaries have the option of adding a stand-alone drug plan to their Fee-for-Service Medicare services, or joining a county-level private-sector comprehensive Medicare Advantage plan that includes prescription drug coverage as well as other Medicare services through a managed care insurer. CMS also provides subsidy of 28% of the total drug cost to employers that continue to offer drug coverage to their retirees to discourage "crowd-out". 4 The market is still in its infancy, but there is much public concern about how it is functioning. This paper focuses on the stand alone plans, which have enrolled 16.5 million of the 22.5 million Part D enrollees. A total of 1,429 different insurance plans owned by approximately 70 different companies are available in 34 regions into which the country is divided. MMA sets standards for plan design and for oversight in a competitive bidding process to determine premiums, but plans have considerable freedom. There is substantial variation in the premiums charged, and in the design of the benefits, but no systematic econometric analysis has investigated how premiums are affected by benefit design or market factors. While certain features of plan design such as the deductible are evident when plans are selected by consumers (and are observable in a summary file released by CMS), plans can differ in other aspects such as prices negotiated with pharmaceutical companies and the co-payments required from the beneficiaries for different drugs. These are attributes researchers and consumers can only observe through web queries and an examination of the plan's formulary (Hoadley et al, 2006) . 5 An analysis of the premium setting behavior of Part D plans without taking into 4 A comprehensive explanation of the implementation of the MMA can be found in Hoadley (2006) , Gold (2006a,b) and MedPAC (2005, 2006) , and in the H.R. 1 act itself (U.S. Congress, 2003) 5 There are two important caveats regarding the posted full prices. One is that insurer/PBM negotiations with pharmacies/ manufacturers will be reflected in drug prices as well as rebates, and we are unable to observe rebates. Second, it appears that insurers sometimes did not report a full price of a drug to CMS, and in these cases CMS imputed the prices with average wholesale prices. It is not known to what extent this was done, nor does CMS officially acknowledge this, but to the extent that this happens, one should be cautious in interpreting the results of this variable. (Personal communication with Jack Hoadley, August 2006) . A formulary file is available for purchase from CMS, but does not list prices.
account these prices, formulary design and cost-sharing details would be potentially misleading if insurers are relatively more generous in setting visible plan features. We obtained data on less visible plan features (drug prices, formulary design and cost sharing) for each PDP plan by repeatedly querying the plan finder tool implemented by Medicare, for ten sets of drugs. We processed the source code of each resulting web page to create a database of plan attributes to supplement data provided by CMS in data sets.
In addition to the importance of plan characteristics in determining premiums, the institutional setting also created certain incentives that may have influenced plan behavior. For example, insurers were concerned about low enrollment, and knew that being designated by CMS as a "low income subsidy" (LIS) eligible plan would guarantee automatic enrollment of the dual Medicaid-Medicare eligible population. In our analysis we take into account the institutional details as well as the regional attributes that may affect plans' behavior, making this another contribution of our paper.
We proceed by first describing the institutions governing this market and then surveying the budding literature on this topic. We then describe our hypotheses, and the data used to test them. We conclude with a discussion of the results and what they tell us about insurer premium setting in this first year of the program.
The Medicare Part D Market
Medicare to May 15 th 2006, during which time the elderly could make decisions about participating in this market. Although MMA specifies a standard drug benefit, the law allows deviations from that design as long as the modified plans are actuarially equivalent to the 6 Before the enactment of MMA, private plans could also provide the benefits of Parts A and B of Medicare as Part C, later named
Medicare+Choice. However, the benefits of Parts A and B have been delivered mainly through the traditional fee-for-service Medicare, with private plans accounting for 15% of the total Medicare enrollees in 2000 and 12% in 2005 . (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005 standard benefit. 7 Beneficiaries are locked in to their current plan for a full year, but are allowed to switch plans each open enrollment period at a premium that is community rated.
The standard drug benefit design specified in MMA for year 2006 comprises a deductible of $250 and three coverage zones where the fraction of the additional drug dollar covered by the insurer varies substantially. Figure 1 shows how out of pocket drug expenses vary with total drug spending in the different coverage zones of the plan. After the deductible is exhausted, the elderly are covered 75% for the next $2,000 spent in total prescription drug expenditure (initial coverage zone, ICZ), 8 0% between $2,250 and $5,100 (so the next $2,850) of total drug expenditure, the infamous doughnut hole zone, and 95% after the $5,100 threshold (catastrophic coverage zone). Thus, at the point that catastrophic coverage begins, the beneficiary has spent $3,600 out of pocket ($250 in zone 1, $500 in zone 2, and $2,850 in region 3). Beneficiaries may buy their drugs at pharmacies (the insurer may have a network of preferred pharmacies, outside of which cost sharing is higher), and the plan may also allow the use of mail order purchasing which may often be cheaper. Plans are allowed to use utilization controls such as prior authorization, quantity limits 9 and step therapy for drugs (Hoadley, 2005) . Formularies can be closed (allowed to exclude any payment for certain drugs) or open in the sense that all drugs are covered by not on the same terms. Formularies are reviewed by CMS to ensure that there are no egregious attempts to discriminate against certain illnesses, that all drugs in certain classes are covered, and to make sure that at least two drugs from each class are included on the formulary, but it is not known to what extent these rules were enforced.
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Insurance companies can deviate in plan design from the standard benefit described above and offer a variety of plans as long as they satisfy certain requirements.
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For example, an insurer can offer plans with lower or no deductibles and higher 7 To the extent that the plan is more generous in actuarial terms than the standard benefit, the additional premium associated with the extra coverage is not subsidized by CMS. 8 Recall that spending on drugs not on the formulary does not count towards this $2,000 or any other amounts. 9 To clarify, a quantity limit does not mean that there is a maximum amount of the drug that can be dispensed for the year. A quantity limit is the maximum amount that can be dispensed at one time. 10 CMS asked US Pharmacopeia to develop a new set of classes for this specific purpose (Hoadley, 2005) . 11 These are a) they should provide the same catastrophic coverage as the standard benefit (same cost sharing rule of 5% and same threshold of $3,600 in true out of pocket expenses) b) the deductible should not be higher than the standard benefit's deductible of $250 c) assure actuarial equivalency of i) the value of total coverage (eg if they remove the deductible, the cost sharing in the initial coverage zone should be set higher than 25%), ii) cannot increase the threshold at which the 3 rd coverage zone ends (the end of the donut hole) and iii) cannot change the threshold at which the 3 rd coverage zone starts (start of the donut hole). These details are contained in the 2003 MMA coinsurance rates for the initial coverage zone, or offer plans with tiered cost sharing in the initial coverage level as long as the tiered structure is equivalent to the standard 25% coinsurance rate.
12 Private insurers have taken advantage of the ability to offer modified plans and only nine percent of the 2006 plans have the standard benefit design. In addition to benefit designs that are identical or actuarially equivalent to the standard benefit, insurance companies can also offer enhanced plans, i.e., coverage that is more generous than the standard benefit. In fact, firms could design up to three benefit packages per region, as long as one of them was standard or actuarially equivalent to a standard plan (Hoadley et al, 2006) .
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To implement the new Medicare benefit, the country was divided into 34 regions in the case of PDPs and 26 regions in the case of MA-PDs (see Figure 1 from CMS for a map of the PDP regions). 14 To participate in these markets, the insurance companies submit bids (separate bids for each region, even if they design just one plan to be offered will also ask plans to separately inform them of the cost of covering an individual if CMS were to not provide this reinsurance, in order to asses the total amount by which CMS subsidizes the coverage. This reporting is also required by MMA to make sure that CMS's total subsidy to Part D (which includes the subsidy through reinsurance and the 'direct subsidy' paid prospectively to the insurer) on average comes to 74.5% of the total cost of providing this new coverage.
12 For example, a company cannot offer a plan with higher initial coverage limit higher than $2,250 (in 2006) that has a higher coinsurance rate above the deductible since this would violate condition iii) in footnote 11. 13 However, the costs of the extra benefit will not be subsidized by the government, and therefore, the beneficiaries will have to pay an additional premium at the market rate. Enhanced plans must submit separate bids, in which it is made clear what portion of the plan is standard and what part is additional. On average, the monthly premium for enhanced benefits is $10 higher per month than the premium for basic coverage (standard or modified). An example of enhanced benefits would be provision of coverage within the doughnut hole. It is also important to note that such coverage is considered additional to the standard Part D benefit and will not count towards reaching the catastrophic coverage threshold .
14 The regions are composed of one or more states, and were set by the government at the beginning of year 2005. The regions were established to meet the MMA requirement of having no fewer than 10 and no more than 50 regions in all, and to maximize the availability of plans to eligible individuals regardless of health status, with particular attention to rural areas. Most (25) PDP regions consist of one state, six consist of two states pooled together, one consists of three states, one consists of four states, and one consists of seven states 15 This means that only 15% of the catastrophic cost will be paid by the insurance company as the remaining 5% is the beneficiary's liability by the plan design. 16 MMA also calls for 'risk corridors' (which will be explained later) to further reduce adverse selection fears and incentives to cream skim.
The bidding process was such that CMS set a plan's premium according to how much that plan's bid was above or below the national average bid. Under certain assumptions, the plan's bid is simply a constant dollar amount above their premium so that analyzing premiums is tantamount to analyzing bids. Plans were also insulated to a large degree from losses (and profits) by reinsurance (CMS would pay for 80% of the catastrophic costs), rate adjustment based on observed risk characteristics of those who enrolled, and risk corridors (CMS guaranteed protection from losses and denied plans the ability to keep substantial profits). Appendix 1 contains a discussion regarding the mechanical setting of plan premiums and these risk reduction mechanisms. Plans also understood the subsidies to low-income beneficiaries (which would reduce price elasticity of demand) and that dual Medicaid-Medicare beneficiaries would automatically be enrolled in plans that met a certain threshold for premiums regionally. Appendix 2 details these special provisions for low-income beneficiaries.
Hypotheses
Premium setting of PDP plans during the first year is worth studying for several reasons. First, insurers could be testing out the water in this unfamiliar market and may price in idiosyncratic ways that will differ from their long run strategy. Humana is the clearest example of this; their Vice President and Chief Actuary has publicly announced that their strategy is to offer generous benefits at a low cost the first year to maximize enrollment and transfer customers to their MA products in the long run (Bertko, 2005) .
Thus, we expect to find a strong insurer specific component to the bids even after controlling for all other observable features.
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Second, we test whether the number of competitors in a market influences an insurer's bid. Given that each market had over 10 insurers participating, it is likely that the threshold has passed beyond which the number of competitors will affect the premiums (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991) . However, this assumes that the insurers knew ahead of time how many competitors they would face in a market. Insurers were asked to file intentions to participate in bidding prior to submitting bids, and although CMS revealed the total number of insurers who expressed interest, they did not break it down 17 Note that empirically we will not be able to disentangle price differences that result from a strategy such as one that deliberately undercut prices from those that result due to unobservable differences such as reputation of the insurer.
by region. Insurers may still have gained good knowledge, eg through press releases from insurers, that they would face a substantial degree of competition in each market.
Other market characteristics we predict will influence bid amounts include the expected usage in a region (with premiums being lower in areas where drug use is relatively lower), 18 the fraction of the population that will receive low-income subsidies above the Medicaid level (expecting that premiums will be higher in these regions if this implies lower price elasticity of demand), the fraction of the population on Medicare Table A4 ). At the same time, geographical variation in health care use in general is large (e.g. Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner, 2002) . Although the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA, the trade association for Pharmacy Benefit Managers {PBMs} who help insurers implement formularies) argues that eliminating unnecessary geographical variation in utilization is one of the goals of including cost-control measures in Part D formularies, 18 we expect that at least in the short run, these geographical differences will persist and be built into premiums. (The President of PCMA is reported saying this in a news release May 15 th 2006 in response to a Dartmouth Atlas report (http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=65876)) The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care in Michigan finds substantial small-area variation in prescription drug use among a population enrolled in the Michigan Blue Cross Blue Shield Plan (Wennberg and Wennberg, 2006) . Under the assumption that similar variation exists across states and regions, we expect that regions with higher utilization of drugs will see higher premiums. To the extent that seniors are constrained in their drug use because of the lack of drug coverage prior to MMA 2003, this would be an underestimate of the differences in regional utilization that would surface under Part D. In that case, measures of the health status of different regions would be more indicative of the differences in usage that would occur once MMA covered drugs. Insurers used sophisticated models and expert actuarial services to forecast costs in the bidding process, thus the measures used here to test theories should only be considered approximations to shed light on pricing strategies. 19 See for example Riley et al. (1994) , Morgan et al. (1997) , Brown et al. (1993) who find evidence of favorable selection; however other papers such as Dowd et al (1995) and Rogers and Smith (1995) do not. 20 If Part D is marketed through the same channels as Medigap plans, the insurer's presence in the Medigap market may be the most important variable for the marketing costs story. 21 We do have access to a 2006 MA market share measure, which is measured at the parent organization level and nationally. Ideally, we would have liked to use a measure that is predetermined (i.e. not from 2006) and which varies by region too. We use the 2006 MA market share variable in some specification to see if pricing differed by MA market share of the PDP insurers. market is the expected payout, which is the risk of a claim multiplied by the amount of coverage in the event of a claim, plus some loading cost. Medicare Part D could be viewed partly as an insurance plan and partly as a simple subsidy as customers are asked to select plans based on drugs they already take, and because of the high persistence of drug use in this population (Coulson and Stuart, 1992) . Thus, our first prediction from a textbook model of premium determination is that increases in the generosity of the plan will increase the premium.
22 This includes the extent to which plan formularies are inclusive, the extent to which they apply tools of utilization management such as prior authorization, 23 whether they cover drugs during the doughnut hole zone. We also measure the generosity of a plan as the total out of pocket costs associated with certain sets of drugs. We aim to create a full picture of the plan's formulary and cost sharing structure in parsimonious ways.
Fourth, we test whether incentives created by program rules, such as the reward for low-premium plans in terms of automatic conferment of dual Medicaid-Medicare enrollees with no marketing costs incurred, influenced the design of plans. This assumes that plans used a strategy of deciding ahead of time whether (and which plan) they would pitch as a low premium plan that would qualify for LIS status (by equation A.3. in the appendix) and that they knew what approximate benchmarks to anticipate. To the extent there is uncertainty on the part of plans as to the premium needed to qualify for LIS status, these estimates should be viewed with caution as this may simply capture the fact that this plan has a negative residual.
Thus, premiums are expected to be a function of plan characteristics, some of which are observable to the econometrician (X i ) unobservable plan characteristics ( ) and region-specific attributes (X j )
There are many other unobservable firm characteristics that remain unmeasured.
Some firms are likely to have a competitive edge, because of experience and data gathered from offering a drug discount card prior to 2006 (Gold, 2006 . Prior experience in the MA market should also have helped, as would having strategic partnerships with 22 This abstracts from possible moral hazard and adverse selection that could occur as plans are more or less generous. MMA's risk adjustment reduces the fear of adverse selection in theory, but it nevertheless possible that part of the reason that premiums would rise with generosity is due to adverse selection and moral hazard. 23 But this does not tell us the extent to which these utilization tools were enforced. We cautiously use a measure of complaints about the plan as indicative of how much these measures were used.
marketing channels, advertising direct to consumers, or negotiating power with pharmacy networks through PBMs. If the different firms and plans owned by the same parent companies have access to the same marketing channels etc, the error structure may be correlated across these observations. We account for this by seeing if our results are robust to clustering the standard errors at the parent organization level. We also see if our results are sensitive to clustering at the formulary level or the plan name level. Some insurers use the same formulary across all their products, while others vary them over products and regions. A formulary (list of drugs for which insurer will cover expenses at all) does not imply the same cost sharing necessarily-for example we found instances of differences in cost sharing amounts for the same drugs even when plans shared the same formulary. A unique plan name that appears in different regions could also share unmeasured characteristics (in addition to measured characteristics which we include in the regression). Last, we use parent-organization fixed effects to capture all unobservable parent organization characteristics and inform us about how insurers set premiums among their different plan options. This also tests our first hypothesis about the existence of large fixed insurer components to the bids.
Literature Review
The deep interest in this topic has produced a number of descriptive papers out of pocket medication costs of the largest 14 insurers at the drug level for the lowest premium plan they offer. They consider the formulary treatment of a large number of brand name and generic drugs by different insurers and plans. They find that across plans, there are substantial differences in whether drugs are placed on the formulary at all, and in the treatment given to ones on the formulary (eg in terms of cost sharing, and whether utilization management tools are used). They find that the most commonly used cost sharing arrangement among the plans studied is a three-tier system with copays around $5/$25/$53 for generic, preferred brand and non preferred brand. Some plans also have a separate tier for 'specialty drugs' which are biotechnical drugs etc. CMS issued guidelines stating that plans must cover two drugs in each drug category, at least one of each key drug type, and required all drugs be on the formulary in 6 specific classes (anticonvulsants, antidepressants, antineoplastics, antipsychotics, antiretrovirals, and immune suppressants) (Hoadley et al 2006) . But this does not restrict the prices charged.
Plans were also allowed to design a classification system that differed from the one CMS used and were allowed to request exceptions to these coverage requirements; it is not known how much these were used.
One point to keep in mind here and in the out of pocket simulations conducted in this paper is that the true impact of differences in drug prices and cost sharing across plans may be smaller than measured to the extent that beneficiaries work with their physicians to find drugs that are cheaper on their plan's terms but are just as effective in treating their condition-or to the extent that patients succeed in requesting that drugs they take be covered or moved to a lower cost sharing tier. Similarly, the actual stringency of step therapy approvals and prior authorization requests are not known, and would tend to reduce the generosity of the plan. to the enhanced availability of drug coverage. But, to our knowledge, there is no systematic analysis yet of actual Part D plan premiums.
Methods and Data
Our paper will test the hypotheses above using data on premiums and plan (2006) . These fit into 8 lists of 25 drugs each. We then created two additional drug lists which consisted of the top 5, and a random set of 5 drugs, from the top 100 drugs in order to give weight to the initial coverage zones of the plans. These 10 lists can be seen in Appendix Table A3 . For all 10 lists, we also specifically measured the monthly out of pocket costs under just the initial coverage zone of the plan. Together, the simulated generosity measures generated by these lists should represent a comprehensive way to gauge the plan, rather than entering each drug price under each coverage region separately. We also create an average of the 10 simulated measures for the annual and the ICZ measures, as we find high correlation between the different measures.
With additional queries on the plan finder tool, we also recovered the full price of a drug listed by an insurer, as well as the prices under the different coverage zones for each plan for each of the 200 or so drug. 28 In Appendix Table A3 , we also show the average full price for the top 25 drugs. 29 As the CMS drug tool requests dosage and monthly quantities when creating drug lists, we consulted with an academic-hospital based pharmacist and a practicing pharmacist to ensure that we entered the most common dosages of the drugs.
As noted already, these measures will differ from actual simulated costs to the extent that patients are able to switch to different drugs that are covered. If the degree of switching is constant across plans, this should not affect us, but if there is more ability to switch in more generous plans, this is a caveat that should be kept in mind. We are similarly unable to gauge the extent of non-price utilizations measures, such prior authorization. To correct for this, we use a measure of the number of top 100 drugs for which the plan requires prior authorization, which is included in the CMS Landscape file.
We obtain two measures of insurer characteristics from other CMS data sets. We use the recently released Part D enrollment file to calculate the parent organization's market share in the non-PDP market, 30 and we use the Medicare Complaint Tracking 28 As can be seen from descriptive statistics presented later, we were not able to find prices for all plans for all lists. In most cases, this was due to CMS not including certain plans in certain months-presumably due to insurer failure to include prices. We collected prices in June and July of 2006-and when we returned to re-collect missing data in August, the website format had changed so that the 'drug details' page is no longer available. We use the top 25 list which has all but two insurers included. 29 The top 25 list of drugs actually translated to only 24 drugs as two drugs on the CMS list only matched to one on the plan finder tool. We nevertheless continue to refer to this as the "top 25" drugs throughout the paper. 30 This is available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/prescriptiondrugcovgenin/02_enrollmentdata.asp?
Module for the consumer complaint rate for PDP plans (complaints per 1,000 enrollees) in the general, 31 and the general number excluding the pricing complaints categories.
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The last set of variables we add to this database is market (PDP region) where X i , consists of plan characteristics described above, and X j consists of regionspecific attributes. We first run regressions of the form ( , ) Pij f Xi ε = where the only plan measure is the 10 alternative simulated out of pocket expenses, for the annual version as well as just the initial coverage zone (ICZ). These results are presented in brevity, and continue to a regression specification that includes other measures that our discussion suggests may be important. Table 4 Table 5 we include an alternative set of plan characteristics that excludes the out of pocket measures, but includes the same set of market characteristics. The new plan characteristics are: average negotiated price for the top 25 drugs; the number of top 100 drugs on the formulary; whether the plan covers generics in the gap (brand as well or only generic); whether the plan is actuarially equivalent or enhanced, as opposed to standard; the annual drug deductible; whether the plan is LIS eligible; and the number of top 100 drugs needing prior authorization. In unreported results, we added the out of pocket (average across all drug lists) measure, for this top 25 average price list and for a few other drug lists. These results showed that the information contained in the drug list is part of our out of pocket generosity measure, and the inclusion of the out of pocket measure caused the coefficients on the drug price variable to diminish to be statistically insignificantly different from zero. Thus, our last table, Table 6 , goes back to using our comprehensive out of pocket measure (instead of the drug price variable) and includes all the plan characteristics and region characteristics included thus far. It shows the effects of accounting for parent organization fixed effects as well as different levels (parent organization, formulary and plan name) clustering of standard errors.
Descriptive Statistics
A high degree of price dispersion characterizes the Medicare PDP market, as can be seen from the first histograms in Figure 3 of monthly premiums for all 1,429 plans.
The second histogram in Figure 3 shows the distributions once we remove enhanced plans, which have an unsubsidized component. This reduces the right tail of the distribution as enhances plans are on average $10 more a month. The next set of histograms show the distribution of the simulated out of pocket measures of the plans (just the annual measures, which we divide by 12 to make comparable with monthly premiums). There are 11 shown; the first is the average of the 10 lists. This shows a fair degree of variation that is less normally distributed relative to premiums. Most of the indices have a set of plans closely situated together in a somewhat normal distribution, with some plans always being outliers. Inspecting the data revealed that the plans that were outliers in one index tended to also be outliers in all indices.
As these indices reflect plan differences in prices negotiated with pharmacy networks, in the formulary, in how drugs are 'tiered' as well as in copays attached to different tiers in different coverage zones, we separate out the portion that resulted from price negotiations by showing the histograms in Figure 5 . The distribution of negotiated drug prices is similar in that there are some plans that are consistent outliers; moreover, these tended to be the same insurers who were outliers in Figure 5 . This suggests that variation in negotiated prices may be responsible for a large part of variation in the simulated out of pocket costs across plans. Table 1 shows the sample statistics of our data set. For most variables, we have information on the universe of plans-notable exceptions are prices of certain drug lists as explained above. Overall, this is a market where average premiums are $37.43 a month, with a standard deviation of $12.86.
Regression Results
The first regression results we present test the theory that premiums should reflect the generosity (OOP) of the plan. In Table 2 , each coefficient represents a different regression where monthly premiums are regressed on just one generosity index. In the first column, there are 10 different indices showing a plan's annual OOP divided by 12, and in the second the index measures the OOP per month in the first coverage zone. The sign on all the different drug lists used in both ways of measuring generosity indicate that premiums rise with the out of pocket payments of the plan, contrary to a simple set up of competitive insurance markets where premiums reflect only generosity along this measure. A log/log specification (not shown) indicated an elasticity of .13 of the premium with respect to the annual monthly average of out of pocket expenses for the top 5 drugs.
Our intention in using multiple drug lists was to see whether our results would be sensitive to the types of medications and the coverage zones under consideration. The results so far indicate that the different indices move in similar ways. In Table 3 we show the correlation coefficients between the different indices. These are consistently high, regardless of whether we look at all coverage zones or just the initial one. In unreported results, we also looked at the correlation between the initial and all coverage zones measure for each drug list, and found those also to be high. Those correlation coefficients varied between .91 and .98 with the average being about .95. We also looked at the extent to which the average prices of the drugs on the list were correlated with the generosity measures. The range was between .45 and .93 and was very similar for the annual OOP measure as it was for the ICZ measure. Thus, from here on our regressions mainly use a comprehensive measure that averages between the 10 lists, and only presents the annual index.
The institutional details of the market suggest that certain plan, ownership unit and market characteristics may influence premiums, and our next specification presents those results. Table 4 shows that the out of pocket measure is still positive and statistically significant, although its magnitude is fairly small (0.004 in the first column) as in the earlier set of results. This implies that as the out of pocket expenses rises on average by one dollar (per month), the premium rises by four tenths of one cent (per month). The number of drugs placed on prior authorization is statistically significant in the first and third columns, indicating that placing one more drug on the PA list will increase monthly premiums by 11 to 19 cents. In contrast to the generosity measure, whether the plan is designated LIS-eligible reduces the premium by 16 to 14 dollars a month, about 40% of the average premium of plans. If the plans that were eventually designated LIS eligible are ones that plans anticipated will meet that target because the insurers anticipated the benchmark correctly, this indicates that plans valued this feature substantially, holding plan generosity constant. In terms of market characteristics, plans that have more dual eligible members in the region are priced slightly lower and this is not statistically significantly different from zero in non LIS plans. The percent of Medicare beneficiaries who were in managed care entities in 2005 has an impact on premiums-having one more percentage point in managed care in 2005 lowers premiums by 16 to 19 cents per month. The total number of Medicare beneficiaries in the region increasing by one thousand increases the premium by two tenths of a cent a month in the first specification, but is not statistically significant in others. Having one more percentage point of the population under 150% FPL (the qualification for the premium subsidy) increases the premiums by 18 to 22 cents a month. This result is consistent with the possibility that plans expected lower price elasticity in these regions because of the premium subsidy. On the other hand, it is surprising if we expected that this also captured general poverty in the region, in which case we could expect insurers to set lower premiums in these regions. The number of insurers in the market does not affect the premium in any statistically significant manner. In unreported results, we added the two questionable market measures-the MA market share and the complaint rate. Both were statistically insignificant when we clustered standard errors at the parent organization level, but when we did not, the complaint rate variable was negative and statistically significant. Table 5 contains the results from a model that excludes the out of pocket measure but includes alternative plan characteristics. It shows that plans with lower listed drug prices have lower premiums. The magnitude suggests that the average drug price in the top 25 drugs increasing by one dollar increases monthly premiums by 64 cents, which is a substantial pass-through of negotiated prices to gain enrollment through lower premiums.
As mentioned, there are two reasons why this should be interpreted cautiously-drug prices do not necessarily reflect the rebates that may be negotiated, and the CMS website may sometimes have shown enrollees imputed prices when plans failed to submit them.
In unreported regressions, we included both the out of pocket generosity measures along with the drug prices of 5 lists for which we had prices for over 1,000 plans, and this inclusion always caused the drug price variable to become statistically insignificant, as one would expect because the out of pocket calculation takes drug prices into account.
For this reason, we exclude drug prices but include the out of pocket spending variables in later regressions in Table 6 .
Table 5 also shows that including more top 100 drugs on the formulary increases premiums by 26 cents per drug, and including coverage in the gap adds $9 (generics) to $23 (generics and brand). Being an actuarially equivalent plan adds $3 relative to a standard design, indicating that insurers believed that deviating from the standard design would be popular among beneficiaries. Once we account for gap coverage, enhanced plans do not sell for more than standard plans. Premiums fall by almost one cent for every dollar increase in the annual deductible, and being a LIS plan reduces premiums again by a substantial amount; $14. The effect of prior authorization lists and the average Rx use in the region are not statistically significant effects. The number of dual eligibles in the region decreases premiums, as does the percent of beneficiaries in managed care products. The size of the Medicare population in a region and the percent of them who are eligible for a premium subsidy lead to increases in premiums.
We then proceed to include only the average OOP measure in Table 6 , where we include all other control variables used so far and explore the sensitivity of our results to various assumptions about the structure of the variance-covariance matrix. The first column of Table 6 shows the same specification as Table 5 number that is about $3 smaller than all plans in general. However, this suggests that the LIS variable is not simply capturing random low-prices as even within an insurer, the plan designated as the LIS one is on average 9 dollars cheaper even after controlling for all else. 38 The adjusted R 2 of this regression is 0.82, as opposed to about .6 when parent fixed effects are not included.
As a final robustness check, we estimated this last column excluding two insurers whose strategies may not be representative of others. UHC-Pacificare and Humana went on to command a large share of eventual enrollment, 39 and while this may be an indication of a successful premium setting strategy, we would like to see if the basic stories told here hold for other insurers too. An inspection of the fixed effect for Humana in the earlier fixed effects specifications shows that relative to Aetna, Humana's coefficient is 25 dollars less (standard error of $1.2), consistent with the strategy announced by Humana (Bertko, 2005) . However, the regression results are strikingly similar when the 93 plans belonging to Humana were dropped from the 1429 plans. We next dropped UCH-Pacificare, whose fixed effect was only 3 dollars less (standard error of $1.01) relative to Aetna. After dropping the 174 plans that belonged to this insurer, the results were once again strikingly similar to the results using the full set of plans.
Discussion
This paper takes a first look at factors that theory suggests would be important in setting premiums in this highly regulated Medicare PDP market. We create simulated out of pocket measures that capture many features of a plan's generosity that are not easily available for research. We find that simulated out of pocket measurers consistently fail to show a negative relationship with premiums. This is potentially due to the fact that insurers appear to have followed very different strategies as shown by the insurer fixed effect coefficients. We find some evidence that lower drug prices are reflected in lower premiums, but the fact that rebates are not measured and that there is some doubt as to the quality of the data suggest caution in interpretation until CMS clarifies this issue.
Several other factors appear to have been influential in plan premium setting, such as targeting the automatic enrollment of dual Medicaid-Medicare enrollees (although these results have to be interpreted with caution as they assume that insurers had reasonable expectation of the benchmarks they would need to reach). Other regional characteristics such as the share of the Medicare market already in managed care 38 We also estimated Table 6 without the low-income eligible subsidy indicator and found our results to be qualitatively unchanged, except for the coefficients on the plan type (actuarially equivalent and enhanced) indicators. 39 The largest PDP parent organization enrolled 27% of the market (UHC-Pacificare), and the second (Humana) enrolled 18%. There are 3 other parent organizations with more than 5% of enrollment each (Wellpoint Inc, Member Health Inc and WelllCare Health Plans Inc) (CMS, 2006) . products appear to matter, although our predictions regarding this variable were ambiguous.
The risk management strategies and community rating used in this market may have encouraged plans to concentrate more on increasing the size of the client base rather than selectively enrolling a few good risks, although this will be known only once detailed enrollment data are available.
Several caveats hold, some of which are stated above. In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that the measures of generosity and PDP market characteristics are only approximations to what is probably included in an insurer's sophisticated actuarial model, and the only intention of this paper is to test certain theories rather than mimic the insurer's model. The factors that drive second and subsequent year pricing are likely to change-for example, if one expects inertia in plan choice, then the incentive may be greatest to enroll customers the first year when they are most elastic in their enrollment decisions. The first year may also represent a shot in the dark, and insurers may refine their strategies as they gain more experience in this market.
It will be important to monitor the pricing behavior of plans in future years as new data become available starting October 15 th 2006.
. Note:
The graph above shows how the insurance benefit translates total prescription drug costs (x axis) to out of pocket costs for a beneficiary (y axis). Source: Author depiction of standard plan details announced by CMS. Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% ). 40 The premium for plan Pij will then be set at some fraction of the average bid A, plus (or minus) the amount by which plan ij's bid was above (or below) the national average A [Pij=Bij-A+xA]. The base premium, xA, is set to meet CMS's statutory requirement in terms of paying 74.5% of a plan's total cost (assuming no reinsurance). In other words, CMS is required to pay a certain percent (74.5%) of the total private sector cost as subsidy, and they are doing so by taking responsibility for the bulk of the catastrophic cost as well as by paying plans a certain fixed amount prospectively. The average plan will have a total cost of TC , and a If r and A are constants from the firm's perspective (even if A is not known ahead of time), then their premium is just their bid minus a fixed amount. 41 We illustrate the bidding process with an example in Understanding the premium determination process has two implications. One is that studying the determinants of the premium is equivalent to studying the 'bid', and second that plans have incentives to offer lowest bid possible if they aim to attract beneficiaries with lower premiums (for coverage that is equal in other ways). The direct subsidy is paid prospectively to the firm as a fixed up-front dollar amount, with some risk adjustments along age, sex, disability, and the presence of certain chronic conditions.
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The second mechanism used to limit the insurance risk of the firms is the risk corridor system. Under this system, plans that have actual costs that exceeded their expected costs (after accounting for the reinsurance feature) by a sufficiently large amount, may receive additional payments to compensate for those losses. In the same way, if plans make larger than expected profits due to actual costs being lower than the expected ones, the plans would have to return those extra profits to the government. For years 2006 and 2007, the plans will be responsible for all the profits and losses that are within a band of 2.5% from their expected costs. If the actual costs are bigger (smaller) than the expected costs by more than 2.5% but less than 5% the government will pay (receive) 75% of the amount in that range. If the actual costs differ with the expected costs by more than 5% then the government will pay 80% of the amount beyond 5% in the case of losses and receive 80% of the amount beyond 5% in the case of profits. Table   A2 illustrates how the risk corridor system works.
In setting up the institutional relationship with insurers, CMS thus includes three features-reinsurance, risk corridors and a risk adjustment of the prospective payment-to reduce fears of adverse selection and incentives to cream skim. We next turn to discussion additional institutional details as they affect beneficiaries. 43 The exact coefficients that are used in risk adjustment can be found at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DrugCoverageClaimsData/02_RxClaims_PaymentRiskAdjustment.asp
Appendix 2: Additional Subsidies Received by Low-income Beneficiaries
In additional to the general subsidy of 74.5% of the average plan's cost, MMA also includes provisions regarding the coverage of low-income beneficiaries. The lowincome (defined as incomes being below 150% of the poverty level) elderly will receive additional subsidies which will depend on their income and assets in specific ways. The dual eligible population (those eligible for Medicare and Medicaid) will be automatically enrolled by CMS in a low income subsidy (LIS) eligible plan, although they may switch to another LIS eligible plan if they wish and continue to pay no premium, no deductible, and not face a doughnut hole. They will pay no co-payments once they reach catastrophic coverage, but they will face copayments before that point of roughly $1-3 for generics and $2-5 for brand name drugs. The dual eligible population in nursing homes receives their drugs at no charge always. The elderly that are not dual eligible but have incomes below 135% of the federal poverty line will receive the same benefit as someone who is dual eligible (and will be reimbursed a sum equal to the LIS benchmark for that region so they are free to select a non-LIS plan and pay a nominal premium, and are not autoenrolled for obvious reasons) (Gold, 2006a) . The non-dual eligible population that is between 135% and 150% of poverty line will pay a premium that will increase along a sliding scale up to the regular monthly payment for people above 150% of poverty line, they will have a deductible of $50, and they will face a constant 15% coinsurance until catastrophic coverage is reached, after which they will face a regular coinsurance rate of 5%. As the dual eligible population is randomly and equally enrolled in LIS plans, insurance plans were expected to find it attractive to be given this designation to reduce uncertainty in size of enrollment. A plan is LIS eligible if its submitted bid is below the "low-income benchmark premium". The benchmark is computed regionally as the greater of the average premiums of PDPs and MA-PDs, and the lowest PDP premium (in case this first number is lower than the lowest PDP, as only PDP plans will be designated "LIS" eligible). Formally, the benchmark premium for LIS in region j is: % difference between expected and actual costs 5.0 1.0 -10.0 Source: CBO (2004) . Note: The plans will be responsible for all the profits and losses that are within a band of 2.5% from their expected costs. If the actual costs are bigger (smaller) than the expected costs by more than 2.5% but less than 5% the government will pay (receive) 75% of the amount in that range. If the actual costs differ with the expected costs by more than 5% then the government will pay 80% of the amount beyond 5% in the case of losses and receive 80% of the amount beyond 5% in the case of profits.: Table A3 
